Abstract The increasing block tariff (IBT) is among the most widely used tariffs by water utilities, particularly in developing countries. This is due in part to the perception that the IBT can effectively target subsidies to low-income households. Combining data on households' socioeconomic status and metered water use, this paper examines the distributional incidence of subsidies delivered through the IBT in Nairobi, Kenya. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that high-income residential and nonresidential customers receive a disproportionate share of subsidies and that subsidy targeting is poor even among households with a private metered connection. We also find that stated expenditure on water, a commonly used means of estimating water use, is a poor proxy for metered use and that previous studies on subsidy incidence underestimate the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through water tariffs. These findings have implications for both the design and evaluation of water tariffs in developing countries.
Introduction
The increasing block tariff (IBT) is among the most widely used tariffs by water utilities, particularly in developing countries. According to a recent survey of water utilities across the globe, 53% of utilities in the sample implement an IBT, with 74% of utilities in developing countries doing so [GWI, 2013] . In a traditional IBT, the marginal price for water use increases from one usage block to the next and customers are charged the marginal price for water use in each block accordingly. The popularity of the IBT reflects two widely held perceptions about its potential merits. First, policy makers believe a low marginal price in the lowest usage block of an IBT, often referred to as a ''lifeline block,'' will ensure that low-income households have access to a certain quantity of water at a price deemed affordable. Second, they believe that higher prices in the upper block(s) of the IBT can both prevent wasteful or extravagant water use and provide an opportunity to improve cost recovery from households who use more water. The intuitive appeal of the IBT rests on the implicit assumptions that all households have a private piped connection to the water network and that low-income households use less water than high-income households.
Scholars have long questioned whether these assumptions are valid in low-income and middle-income countries [Whittington, 1992; Boland and Whittington, 2000; Komives et al., 2005] . This has led to a body of empirical work that has challenged common intuition about the poor access to water and sanitation services and the relationship between household income and water use [e.g., Komives et al., 2006 Komives et al., , 2007 Banerjee et al., 2010; Banerjee and Morella, 2011; Barde and Lehmann, 2014] . In this paper, we examine the distributional incidence of subsidies delivered through the increasing block water tariff in Nairobi, Kenya. We combine socioeconomic data from a household survey with household data on metered water use to estimate the distribution of subsidies among residential customers with a private metered connection in Nairobi. We then use a complete set of customer billing records from Nairobi City Water and Sewer Company (NCWSC) to estimate the distribution of subsidies among all residential customers, including those with shared connections. Finally, we expand the scope of our analysis and examine the distribution of subsidies among residential and nonresidential customers in Nairobi.
Our analysis departs from existing studies in the subsidy incidence literature in three ways. First, studies in the literature typically use stated expenditure on water from household interviews to estimate water use. To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine household-level socioeconomic data with data on metered water use to estimate subsidy incidence in the water sector. Second, unlike the majority of studies in the literature, we use empirical, city-specific estimates of the cost of providing water and wastewater services to estimate subsidy incidence. Finally, all previous studies in the literature focus on the distribution of subsidies among residential customers. Our study extends the literature by examining the distribution of subsidies among all customer classes.
We find that the IBT implemented in Nairobi is not targeting subsidies to low-income households effectively. Among households with a private metered connection, households in the lowest wealth quintile receive less than 20% of the subsidies delivered to these customers. Subsidy targeting improves slightly when we examine subsidy incidence among all residential customers, but higher-income customers still receive a disproportionate share of subsidies. Our analysis of subsidy incidence among all customer classes indicates that nonresidential (e.g., commercial, industrial, and bulk water) customers, who constitute 5% of customer accounts, receive over a third of the subsidies delivered through the tariff. We also find that stated expenditure is a poor proxy for metered water and that the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the water tariff is substantially larger than previous studies would suggest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper discusses the issue of subsidy incidence and provides a review of the subsidy incidence literature in the water sector. Sections 3 and 4 describe our empirical strategy and the data used in our analysis, respectively. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 provides a discussion of our results and some concluding remarks.
Background and Literature Review
Despite the intuitive appeal of IBTs, there are a number of reasons why the IBT may not effectively target subsidies to low-income households in many low-income and middle-income country contexts. For example, in order for a household to receive a subsidy that is delivered through the water tariff, it must have a piped connection. However, poor households often lack a piped water connection and are thus largely excluded from subsidies provided through low-priced water delivered through a piped connection. Similarly, low-income households are also often more likely than wealthier households to have a shared connection to the piped water network (e.g., a yard tap) and to live in multiunit dwellings that are served by a single meter. Households that share a connection or live in a multiunit dwelling served by a single meter pay a higher volumetric price for water than if they had an individual meter because the collective water use of those who share a connection falls in the upper, more expensive, blocks of the IBT. Finally, the extent to which household income and water use are highly correlated is an empirical question, even among households with a private piped connection. Indeed, the limited empirical evidence in the literature suggests that the correlation between household income and water use is much less than commonly assumed [Whittington et al., 2015] .
Concerns about the extent to which the IBT, and utility tariffs more broadly, can be used to effectively target subsidies to low-income households has led to a body of empirical research on subsidy incidence. (See Appendix A for a summary of studies that have been published on subsidy incidence since 2000.) To calculate the distributional incidence of subsidies delivered through the water tariff, the analyst needs information on the magnitude of the subsidy received by each household and the relative income or wealth of each household. The subsidy received by each household is the difference between what it costs to provide the particular household with a particular level of service (e.g., water or water and wastewater service) and what the household actually pays for this service.
The cost of serving each household is a function of households' water use, whether the household has only water or water and wastewater service (i.e., their ''level of service''), and the unit cost of providing water and wastewater services. The amount households pay for water and sanitation service is a function of households' water use, their level of service, and the tariff the utility uses to calculate their monthly bill for water and sanitation services. Thus, in total the analyst must have five pieces of information to estimate subsidy incidence: households' water use, households' level of service, the unit cost of providing water and wastewater services, the tariff, and some measure of households' wealth or socioeconomic status. Assembling For example, data on households' socioeconomic status and demographics are typically available in secondary household survey data, such as national income and expenditure surveys, World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) data, and some national censuses. However, these surveys typically do not contain information on household water use. Similarly, utility billing records contain information on household water use, provided customers are metered, the meters are working, and the utility regularly reads customers' meters. Due to confidentiality requirements, however, it is typically not possible to match householdlevel socioeconomic data in nationally representative household income and expenditure surveys and customer data in utility billing records.
Because it can be difficult or not possible to obtain good measures of both socioeconomic status and water use for the same household, studies in the literature typically use a single data source to obtain information on both households' socioeconomic status and water use. In particular, most studies use households' stated expenditure on water to estimate households' water use. They collect this information either through primary household surveys [e.g., Bardasi and Wodon, 2008; Angel-Urdinola and Wodon, 2012] or from nationally representative household budget and expenditure surveys (e.g., World Bank LSMS data). (See Appendix B for a discussion of why stated expenditure may not be a good proxy for metered water use.)
Studies in the subsidy incidence literature (Appendix A) address the issue of cost in three general ways.
(Appendix C provides a summary of cost estimates used in the literature.) First, studies may use generic cost estimates, or international benchmarks, to calculate subsidy incidence [e.g., Komives et al., 2005 Komives et al., , 2006 Foster and Yepes, 2006] . There is broad consensus in the literature that de facto subsidies delivered through the water tariff are poorly targeted and largely regressive (see Appendix A). Indeed, many studies find that subsidies delivered through the water tariff perform worse than if the subsidies were equally distributed among the population. This is principally due to the fact that low-income households are less likely to have a private connection to the piped water network and, thus, do not receive subsidies delivered through the water tariff.
Studies that examine subsidy incidence only among households with a piped connection also find that subsidies are poorly targeted. This is primarily because income and water use are often not highly correlated and the tariff implemented by many utilities is not sufficient to cover the cost of providing service. These empirical results are supported by simulations conducted by Whittington et al. [2015] that suggest little can be done to improve subsidy targeting when tariffs are not sufficient to cover costs.
There are three main gaps in the water literature on subsidy incidence. First, studies in the literature either focus only on subsidies associated with the delivery of piped water service or do not explicitly state whether they include subsidies associated with wastewater service. Piped wastewater services are usually more expensive to provide than piped water services. To the extent that wastewater services are sold below cost and to the extent that higher-income households are more likely to have connections to the piped wastewater network, estimates in the literature may overestimate the performance of subsidies delivered through the tariff.
Second, nearly all of the studies in the literature use stated expenditure to estimate water use, which may be a poor proxy for metered water use. Thus, it is unclear whether the broad consensus in the literature is attributable to the fact that studies use the same, potentially flawed, measure of water use.
Finally, all of the studies in Appendix A focus on subsidy incidence only among residential customers. This is not surprising given that these studies use data from household surveys. As a result, however, the literature ignores the distributional issues between residential and nonresidential (e.g., commercial, industrial, and bulk.) customers. Depending on the tariff applied to nonresidential customers, failing to include 
Empirical Strategy
This study was designed to fill these gaps in the subsidy incidence literature. Our empirical strategy proceeds in three analytical steps. In the first step of our analysis, we combine socioeconomic and demographic data from a survey of 656 households with data on metered water use from NCWSC billing records. We use these data to: (1) estimate the distribution of subsidies among households with a private metered connection, and (2) examine the extent to which stated expenditure is an accurate proxy of metered water use. We focus this first step of the analysis on households with a private metered connection to capture the relationship between household income and water use. Households who shared a connection with another household or family were excluded from our survey sample.
According to the most recent census, less than a quarter of households in Nairobi reported using a private connection to the piped water network as their primary drinking source [Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009] . Approximately half of households used piped water that is not delivered into their dwelling (e.g., a shared tap) as their primary drinking water source. Thus, in the second step of our analysis, we examine the distribution of subsidies among all NCWSC's residential customers, which includes residential customers with shared connections. In the third, final, step, we expand the scope of our analysis to examine the distribution of subsidies among residential and nonresidential customers in Nairobi.
Subsidy Incidence
We obtained information on customer water use from 21 months of NCWSC's billing records. Like many utilities, NCWSC does not read each meter every month. (NCWSC reads approximately 75% of meters each month.) To address this, we calculate monthly water use directly from actual meter readings in the NCWSC billing data as described in equation (1).
where WUSE i,t water use for household i in month t; READING i,t meter reading for household i in month t; READING i,t-1 previous actual meter reading for household i; RDATE i,t date on which NCWSC read the meter for household i in month t; RDATE i,t-1 date of the previous actual meter reading for household i.
We then use the estimates of households' monthly water use obtained in equation (1) to calculate households' average monthly water use over the period covered by the billing records.
We define the subsidy received by each customer as the difference between the cost to serve each household and what a household pays for service. Our analysis of NCWSC's billing records confirms that the utility implements the official tariff (Table 1) to calculate customers' water and sewer bills. Thus, we calculate how much a customer pays by applying NCWSC's official tariff to our estimates of their average monthly water use. NCWSC implements an IBT with 4 usage blocks. In addition to the fixed charge for meter rent, NCWSC applies a minimum charge for 10 m 3 /month-i.e., households that use less than 10 m 3 /month are charged for 10 m 3 /month. A minimum charge irrespective of the volume a household uses is one possible type of positive fixed charge; it is not a necessary or standard feature of an IBT. NCWSC's use of a minimum charge is not unique. According to GWI [2013] , approximately 10% of utilities in their tariff database implement a minimum charge. NCWSC charges customers with a connection to the sewer network an additional 75% of the volumetric portion of their water bill for wastewater service.
We define the cost of serving a particular customer as in equation (2).
where COST i average monthly cost of serving household i (USD/month); WUSE i average water use of household i from equation (1) I ww,i is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a household has wastewater service and 0 otherwise.
We develop empirical estimates of the average cost of providing water and wastewater services. Our cost estimates include both operations and maintenance as well as capital costs. They do not include the opportunity cost of the raw water supply.
We estimate subsidy shares, the share of subsidies received by different groups of customers, to assess subsidy incidence. (We do not examine affordability because this requires making ad hoc assumptions about what is and is not ''affordable.'') Equation (3) defines the share of subsidies going to a particular group of customers.
where S j share of subsidies received by customer group j (j 5 1. . .J); SUB i share of subsidies received by household i.
In the first step of our analysis, j indexes the five wealth quintiles of our survey sample. In the second step, j indexes accounts located in low-income areas and accounts in nonlow-income areas. In the final step of our analysis, j indexes residential, nonresidential, kiosk, and bulk customer classes.
Stated Expenditure as a Proxy for Water Use
We also examine whether stated expenditure is an accurate proxy for metered water use by estimating household water use from households' stated expenditure on water and comparing this to their metered water use. To do this, we ask households if they can recall the amount of their last bill from NCWSC and the number of months of service the bill covered. Equation (4) shows how we impute water use for customers with only piped water service. We use an analogous approach to impute water use for customers with both water and sewer service. 
Data
The first step of our analysis examines subsidy incidence among households with a private connection to the piped water network. For this analysis, we use data from a sample of 656 households that were randomly drawn from two of Nairobi's six service regions, which were purposefully selected to ensure income heterogeneity in our sample. (See Appendix D for a detailed description of the survey and our sampling strategy.) The survey was conducted between November 2013 and January 2014 and collected a range of socioeconomic and demographic information from households, including data on monthly income, household expenditure, and asset ownership. Following Filmer and Pritchett [2001] and Filmer and Scott [2008] , we use principal component analysis to construct an asset index to serve as a proxy for wealth (see Appendix E). We use the asset index as our primary proxy for wealth because approximately 15% of respondents in our sample refused to provide information about their monthly household income. (Assets included in the index include: liquid propane gas (LPG) as a main cooking fuel, biomass or kerosene as a main cooking fuel, separate kitchen, security guard, connection to the electricity grid, mobile phone, internet connection, TV, radio, computer, private car, washing machine, refrigerator, bore well, and additional land in/out of Nairobi.)
We obtain information on customer water use from 21 months of NCWSC's billing records. The billing data cover the period from August 2012 to May 2014. The principal challenge in our empirical strategy was to identify the households in our survey sample in NCWSC's billing records. Like many cities in developing countries, Nairobi does not have a formal system of addresses. Thus, it was not possible to first construct our sample from the billing records and then locate households to conduct the household survey. To address this, we used households' account numbers to identify households in the billing records. Because households do not typically know their NCWSC account number, however, we obtained households' account numbers by matching the serial number on households' water meters with the account numbers on the NCWSC marketing assistants' itineraries. When possible we verified the account number with a physical copy of a household's recent water bill. (Fifty-six percent of households in our sample were able to show enumerators a copy of their water bill. All account numbers matched the accounts associated with the meter serial numbers.)
We use data from 5 years of audited financial statements (FY 2007 (FY to 2012 to estimate NCWSC's average operations and maintenance costs. We derive capital cost estimates from data in NCWSC's water master plan [Ministry of Water and Irrigation and Athi Water Services Board, 2012] and interviews with senior water and sanitation engineers at NCWSC, Athi Water Services Board, and local engineering firms. Table 2 presents the cost estimates we use in our analysis. Assuming 35% nonrevenue water, we estimate the full cost (O&M plus capital costs) of water service to be 1.40 and 1.46 USD/m 3 for wastewater service. (Nonrevenue water refers to water the utility produces but for which it does not receive revenue.) These estimates are higher than the cost estimates used in many studies, but of similar magnitude to the cost estimates in GWI [2004] and Kingdom et al. (unpublished working paper, 2004) once nonrevenue is accounted for (see Tables C1  and C2 in Appendix C).
For the analysis of subsidy incidence among all residential customers and among all customer classes, we obtain information on the water use of NCWSC's approximately 180,000 residential customers from 21 months of NCWSC's billing records. NCWSC does not have socioeconomic or demographic information about its customers. In the absence of household-level data on income or socioeconomic status, one could potentially use household budget and expenditure survey data or recent census data to obtain aggregate information on household characteristics. This is not possible in Nairobi for two reasons. First, the most recent Kenya Integrated Household Budget and Expenditure Survey (2005 Survey ( -2006 contains only 685 observations from Nairobi. Second, data from the most recent census are not publicly available.
To address this, we use the geographic location of customer accounts as a proxy for relative wealth. In particular, we use the GIS location of customer accounts to identify which accounts are located in low-income We obtain information on the location and extent of low-income areas in Nairobi from the MajiData project of Kenya's Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) and Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF). The MajiData project is a multiyear effort to create a database of information related to water and sanitation service provision in all of Kenya's urban low-income areas. As part of this process, the MajiData team identified and mapped low-income areas in the service area of each Water Service Provider in Kenya using publicly available data, stakeholder consultations, and transect walks of each service area. MajiData's classification of low-income areas includes informal settlements, planned areas with planned low-income housing, and informal housing in planned residential areas. To our knowledge, this information is the most comprehensive, up to date mapping of low-income areas in Nairobi.
For our analysis of subsidy incidence among all customer classes, we obtain water use data from the same set of NCWSC billing records described above. NCWSC billing data include 13 different customer classes. We group these customer classes into four general types: residential, nonresidential, bulk, and kiosk. Our nonresidential customer type includes accounts classified as government, community, and industrial. Table 3 presents information on selected characteristics of households in our survey sample. The average household in our sample has four members, which is consistent with the average household size in Nairobi from the latest census. Approximately half of the households in our sample rent their home. Over 90% of households in our sample have a sewer connection. Seventy-eight percent of households in our survey report using their piped water connection as their primary drinking water source. The remaining 22% report using bottled water for their primary drinking water source. Over a quarter of households in our sample report purchasing water from a vendor in the previous year, which reflects the fact that NCWSC does not provide customers 24 3 7 water service. (Table 4 ). Table 4 also shows the average monthly bill for households in the five wealth quintiles. The mean bill for households in the lowest quintile is 931 Ksh/hh/month (approximately 10 USD/hh/month). The mean bill for households in the highest wealth quintile is 1509 Ksh/hh/month (approximately 17 USD/hh/month). As a point of comparison, the mean water and sewer bill for households in the lowest quintile is only 60% of what these households report paying for electricity. For the wealthiest households in the sample, the mean bill is less than a quarter of what they report spending on electricity. ) for households in the highest wealth quintile. Households in the lowest quintile face a higher average price than households in the highest quintile because the tariff includes both a positive fixed charge and minimum charge (e.g., customers are charged for 10 m 3 /month regardless of their water use). These average price estimates reflect the fact that over 90% of households in our sample have a sewer connection. Figure 3 shows the distribution of subsidies across wealth quintiles. If the subsidy were evenly, or randomly, distributed among the population, each wealth quintile would receive 20% of the total subsidy. A welltargeted subsidy would deliver a substantial share of the total subsidies to low-income households. In our sample, households in the lowest quintile receive only 16% of the total subsidy. Households in the top three wealth quintiles receive nearly 70% of the total subsidy, with households in the highest wealth quintile receiving almost 30% of the total subsidy. 
Results

Household Survey-Subsidy Incidence
Household Survey-Stated Expenditure as a Proxy for Metered Water Use
During the survey, we asked households if they could recall the amount of their last bill from NCWSC. Nearly 85% of households in our sample indicated that they could, considerably higher than the 30% reported in . Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of metered versus imputed water use for households who could recall the amount of their previous water bill. The 458 line in Figure 4 traces a line of equality for which imputed and metered water use would be the same for each household. The scatterplot in Figure 4 displays a high degree of dispersion, indicating that stated expenditure does not provide an accurate proxy for metered water use in our sample.
We find that stated expenditure typically overestimates households' water use, often by a substantial amount. This is reflected in Table 5 , which provides summary statistics of metered water use and imputed water use from households in our sample. Average metered water use among households who could recall the amount of their last water bill was approximately 19 m 3 /month The average water use imputed from stated expenditure among the sample, however, was 27 m 3 /month (42% higher).
Subsidy Incidence Among All Residential Customers
The results presented above examine subsidy incidence among our survey sample, all of whom had a private piped connection. In the second step of our analysis, we expand the scope of our inquiry to examine subsidy incidence among all residential customers. This analysis includes households with a private piped connection as well as households served by a shared connection. NCWSC does not have information on whether accounts are served by shared or individual connections. Thus, the results below examine subsidy incidence among all residential customers and do not directly address water use or subsidy incidence among accounts with shared and individual connections.
Approximately 20% of residential customer accounts in NCWSCs billing records are located in low-income areas identified in the MajiData database. Table 6 provides a summary of water use among residential accounts of different income levels. The mean and median water use in accounts located in low-income areas is 30 and 12 m 3 /month, respectively. This is only slightly lower than the mean (33 m 3 /month) and median (14 m 3 /month) water use of accounts that are not located in low-income areas. Figure 5 provides a summary of subsidy incidence among all NCWSC's residential customers. Accounts located in low-income areas constitute 19% of residential accounts and receive 21% of the total subsidies delivered to residential customers. This is approximately the same amount of subsidies that low-income customers would receive if the subsidy was evenly distributed among residential customers.
Subsidy Incidence among all Customer Classes
We now turn to the results for subsidy incidence among all customer classes. Residential accounts constitute 94% of NCWSC customers (Table 7) . Nonresidential accounts represent 5% of NCWSC customers. The remaining 1% of accounts are official public kiosks and bulk customers. Despite the fact that residential accounts make up the vast majority of NCWSC customers, they account for only 57% of the overall water use and 56% of total billings (Table 7) . Nonresidential customers, on the other hand, account for 35% of the overall water use and 41% of total billings.
We find that nonresidential customers receive 31% of the total subsidy. By contrast, residential customers receive 63% of the total subsidy delivered through the water tariff. Among residential customers, accounts in high-income itineraries represent 21% of accounts and receive 19% of the total subsidy. Accounts in lowincome itineraries represent 14% of total accounts and receive only 9% of the total subsidies, far less than if subsidies were randomly distributed among customers.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis of subsidy incidence among a sample of 656 households in Nairobi with a private metered connection indicates that households in the lowest wealth quintile receive only 15% of the total subsidies delivered to households in our sample. In contrast, households in the highest wealth quintile receive nearly 30% of the subsidies. Thus, among our sample of customers with a private metered connection, the current water tariff performs worse than if the subsidy was randomly distributed among households. In Nairobi, the poor targeting of the subsidies even among households with a private metered connection is driven by a combination of three factors. First, very few customers' water use falls in the uppermost blocks of NCWSC's IBT (Figure 1) . Indeed, over 80% of households in our sample fall in the first two blocks of NCWSC's tariff. Thus, irrespective of the prices in each block there is not a sufficient number of customers in the upper blocks to enable a meaningful level of cross subsidy. Second, at current prices nearly all customers are being subsidized. The average price paid for water and sanitation services among the wealth quintiles in our sample ranges from 0.56 USD/m 3 to 0.90 USD/ m 3 . In contrast, we estimate the full cost of providing water and sanitation services in Nairobi to be approximately 2.86 USD/m 3 . When nearly all customers are subsidized, it is not possible for a subsidy delivered through the tariff to effectively target subsidies to intended beneficiaries. Finally, contrary to common intuition, we find a low correlation between our wealth proxy and water use, which is consistent with the limited data that exist in the literature [Whittington et al., 2015] .
We also find that stated expenditure is a poor proxy for metered water use. Despite the significant measurement error associated with using stated expenditure as a proxy for water use, we find that using stated expenditure to estimate subsidy incidence does not change the policy implications of our findings. This is true in our sample because the majority of NCWSC customers have arrears or credits on their accounts, and we find a low correlation between income and whether customers have arrears or credits. This may not be true in other places. Thus, our findings suggest that researchers should exercise caution when using stated expenditure to estimate water use.
When we expand our analysis to the distribution of subsidies among all NCWSC's 180,000 residential customers, we find that subsidy incidence improves very slightly. Among all residential customers, customers located in low-income areas account for approximately 19% of total residential accounts and receive 21% of the total subsidies delivered to residential customers. This seemingly counterintuitive result can be explained by the fact that low-income customers are more likely to have shared connections, which register high levels of water use, and all water use is subsidized at current prices. While subsidy targeting among all residential customers is slightly better than subsidy incidence among only households with a private connection, errors of inclusion remain high and customers in low-income areas are no better off than if subsidies were randomly distributed among residential customers.
Finally, our analysis of subsidy incidence among all customer classes indicates that nonresidential customers receive over one third of the total subsidies delivered through NCWSC's tariff. Residential customers receive only 63% of the total subsidies. This is not surprising given that all customers are subsidized at current prices and nonresidential customers account for nearly 40% of total water use. However, policy makers often implement an IBT with a lifeline block specifically to target subsidies to low-income, residential customers. We find that this is not occurring in Nairobi. Our results highlight the importance of examining subsidy incidence among all customer classes, which has largely been ignored in the literature.
In addition to our findings related to subsidy incidence, our analysis raises important issues about the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the water tariff. Most studies on subsidy incidence focus on subsidies associated with piped water service among only residential customers. They do not examine subsidies associated with sewer service or subsidies delivered to nonresidential customers. Our analysis suggests that limiting the scope of subsidy incidence in this manner would lead to a substantial underestimate of the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the water tariff.
In Nairobi, examining subsidies associated with piped water service among residential customers would result in a total subsidy that is approximately 40% less than the subsidy associated with both piped water and sanitation services for residential customers. Similarly, we find that examining subsidies associated with both piped water and sewer services among only residential customers would underestimate the total subsidy delivered through the water tariff by 45%. In total, focusing only on subsidies associated with providing water service to residential customers would underestimate the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the water tariff by 65%. We estimate that the total subsidy delivered through the tariff is approximately one and half times NCWSC's total billings.
Policy makers in the water sector often express concern about the affordability of water and sanitation services, especially for low-income households. Indeed, concern about affordability is often the primary justification for keeping water prices low and for implementing an IBT that includes a lifeline block. However, the poorest residents in many cities often rely on vended water from public kiosks or private vendors and pay more for water on a volumetric basis than households with a private connection to the piped network.
Our findings add to a growing body of empirical literature that suggests that IBTs implemented by many utilities do not effectively target subsidies to low-income households. In Nairobi, we find this is particularly true when examining subsidy incidence among all customer classes, but also when we restrict our analysis to households with private metered connections. This is striking given that the poorest households often lack access to piped water and sanitation services altogether. This growing body of evidence suggests that the IBT is an ineffective and often expensive means of delivering subsidies to low-income households. Thus, if policy makers want to subsidize water and sanitation services for low-income households, they should explore alternative subsidy delivery mechanisms, including both connection subsidies and means-tested subsidies (i.e., subsidies for which households must meet an income or wealth criteria).
Appendix A: Summary of Subsidy Incidence Literature Table A1 provides a summary of 21 studies that have been published on subsidy incidence since 2000.
Appendix B: Discussion of Stated Expenditure as a Proxy for Metered Water Use
There are several reasons why imputed water use may not be a good proxy for metered water use. Households may not be able to accurately recall how much they spend on water and sanitation services. Households incur a variety of expenses each month and throughout the year and survey evidence suggests that water constitutes a very small portion of monthly household expenditure (often less than 3%) for households with piped connections [Komives et al., 2005, Appendix C.4 ]. Thus, it is possible that households may have difficulty recalling expenditure on water and sanitation services because they do not represent a major n.a. reports that only 30% of the households were able to recall the amount of their most recent bill.
Angel-Urdinola and
Even if households can perfectly recall their monthly expenditure on water and sanitation services, there are additional reasons why expenditure on these services might be a poor proxy for metered water use. For example, income and expenditure surveys often do not contain information on whether a household connection is metered. If households do have metered connections, the meters may not be working or the utility may not read them on a regular basis. Households may also have a shared connection. In these instances, households' water bills will not reflect their metered water use.
Additionally, household budget and expenditure surveys ask households how much they spent on water last month. They typically do not ask households specifically how much they spent on piped water services, nor do they ask households how much they spent on sanitation services. For example, the most recent Kenya Integrated Household Budget and Expenditure survey asks households ''What was the total cost of water for your household last month?'' [Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2006] . Thus, household recall of expenditure on water in these surveys may include the amount they spent on water from vendors and sewer services.
Water bills may also include fees that are unrelated to water consumption in the most recent billing period. This could include fees for other services (e.g., solid waste collection), pro-rated connection charges, arrears, or penalties for nonpayment. Additionally, countries in Latin America and elsewhere are experimenting with including payment for environmental services in water bills to promote watershed protection [see Whittington and Pagiola, 2012] .
Appendix C: Cost Estimates Used in the Literature
This appendix provides a summary of cost estimates used in the subsidy incidence literature. Table C1 provides an overview of cost estimates used in nine studies. The survey was comprised of eight modules. The first module recorded basic logistical information about the survey, including informed consent, enumerator code, date, and start time. Importantly this module recorded each household's account number, which the enumerators recorded from the NCWSC meter readers' log books. The account number allows us to identify households in the NCWSC billing records.
The second module contained screening questions to ensure the households met the criteria for participation in the study and collected information related to the household's piped water connection. This module also contained questions related to household recall about expenditure on water and sanitation services. The third module of the survey collected information about the household composition and demographics. The fourth module contained questions related to their socioeconomic status, including questions about household expenditure, income, and asset ownership. The fifth module asked households about additional water sources they might use, including private boreholes, water vendors, and bottled water. The sixth module contained a number of questions about the extent to which and under what circumstances households treated their drinking water. The seventh module collected information related to household sanitation facilities. Finally, the eighth module contained wrap up information about the survey, including the enumerators' perceptions of the quality of the survey and the GPS coordinates of the households' location.
In general, wealthier households are more likely to have a connection to the piped water and sewer network than lower income households. Because the objective of the household survey was to investigate the relationship between income and water use among NCWSC customers, the primary challenge for the survey was to ensure the sample had adequate income heterogeneity.
To address limitations of the NCWSC administrative data, our sampling strategy combined purposive and stratified random sampling. NSWCS service area consists of six regions. Each region consists of zones, which are further subdivided into itineraries. There are 26 zones in total and approximately 2000 itineraries. Each itinerary contains between 100 and 200 accounts. NCWSC marketing associates (meter readers) use these itineraries on their daily meter reading routes.
The project team and a committee from NCWSC first assigned an income category to each of the 25 zones based on the subjective, local knowledge of the project team and NCWSC staff members. Due to the fact that the primary sampling challenge was to ensure that the sample had adequate income heterogeneity, the project team then identified the two regions with the highest representation of low-income zones (eastern and northeastern) and randomly selected one of these regions (northeastern). Similarly, we identified the two regions with the highest representation of high income zones (southern and western) and randomly selected one of these regions (western).
Once the two regions were selected, the following sampling strategy was employed. Each day the project team, in collaboration with head of billing and metering from the appropriate regional office randomly assigned enumerators to marketing associates, with two enumerators paired with a single marketing associate. Each pair of enumerators would then shadow a marketing associate on their meter reading route for that day. Starting at the beginning of the itinerary the marketing associate was reading that day, the enumerators were instructed to select the tenth customer account as the first household. The marketing associate would then introduce one of the enumerators to the household and continue on their meter reading route. The second enumerator would select the twentieth account on the list and do the same.
Once the enumerators completed an interview, they would call the marketing associate and meet them where he/she was in their current meter reading route. The enumerator would then use the next account as a sample household. If nobody was at the household, enumerators were instructed to note the address and attempt two call backs. If someone from the household was home, but did not have time to complete the survey or the head of household or their spouse was not home, enumerators were instructed to take the contact information of the head of household and attempt to schedule a call back two times before replacing the household in the sample.
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The survey included a number of quality control measures. First, each day the survey supervisor would collect and review completed questionnaires from the enumerators. If the supervisor identified problems with the questionnaire, enumerators were instructed to revisit the households to verify or correct the information. Second, the project team conducted random spot checks on the enumerators to ensure they followed the prescribed sampling protocol and to ensure that they administered the survey instrument appropriately. This included spontaneously meeting enumerators in the field to observe interviews, conversations with the marketing associates about how the enumerators selected households, and visits or calls to households who had been surveyed to discuss the types of questions the enumerator asked them and how long they spent with them. We also employed double, independent data entry.
As described in the main text, our final sample consists of 656 households. Of the initial 741 households surveyed 83 households were dropped from the sample. One household was dropped due to a duplicate account number; 14 accounts could not be located in the NCWSC billing data; 30 accounts did not have an actual meter reading during the billing period we observed; and 38 accounts had no nonzero meter readings during the billing period we observed.
Appendix E: Wealth Index
We constructed a wealth index using principle component analysis following Filmer and Pritchett [2001] and Filmer and Scott [2008] . Table E1 presents the 28 variables we include in the wealth index. All variables were converted to indicator variables (0-1) or continuous variables as appropriate. The first column of Table E1 presents the first component (factor score) of the principle component analysis. The first component has an eignenvalue of 5.93 and explains 21.2% of variation in the 28 variables in our index. For binary variables, the factor score can be interpreted as the marginal change in a household's wealth index score by going from not owning the asset to owning the asset. For example, cooking with biomass decreases a household's wealth index score by 0.243. Similarly, having a security guard on premise increases a household's wealth index score by 0.201.
The distribution of the wealth index scores is relatively smooth and skewed to the right ( Figure E1 ). The verticle lines in Figure E1 indicate the cutpoints for the wealth index that divide our sample into five quintiles. Each quintile in our sample has 131 or 132 househholds.
The second through sixth columns of Table E1 show the mean of each variable included in the index for households in each predicted wealth quintile. The final column in Table E1 presents the mean for each variable for the entire sample. The mean values for each variable across the wealth quintiles largely agree with our prior assumptions about the relationship between asset ownership and wealth. For example, 1% of households in the lowest wealth quintile report having an internet connection. In contrast, 71% of households in the highest wealth quintile report having an internet connection. Similarly, less than 10% of households in the lowest wealth quintile report owning a car in contrast to 98% of households in the highest wealth quintile. Exceptions to this include the extent to which households own or rent their home and own land/property in or outside of Nairobi. 
